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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the question whether the process of European monetary integration 
implies efficiency-legitimacy trade-off. The paper considers that the process of monetary 
policy delegation to the European Central Bank (ECB), ratified by all European Union 
(EU) parliaments, was a non-zero-sum game, increasing both the efficiency and the 
legitimacy of monetary policy in the eurozone. There was however a change in the nature 
of delegation: the initial principal (EU national governments and/or parliaments) 
delegated to the agent (the ECB) control over its behaviour in regard to monetary policy. 
The paper distinguishes two types of constraints for monetary policy: credibility 
constraints and political constraints. The change in the nature of delegation of monetary 
policy (tying the hands of the principal) was a means of dealing with credibility 
constraints. The paper goes on investigating whether, and if so to what extent, the 
European Parliament (EP) is fit to function as a principal of the ECB as a means of 
dealing with political constraints. Thus, the paper analyses the European Parliament’s 
increased involvement in overseeing the Central Bank’s activities, aiming at 
understanding whether and how that new and special role (an informal institution of 
dialogue) could affect the trade-off between efficiency and legitimacy in the conduct of 
monetary policy in the eurozone. 
 
 
 
JEL classification: E58, E61, E65. 
Keywords: Economic and Monetary Union; monetary policy delegation: efficiency and 
legitimacy; accountability; responsiveness; principal-agent relations; governance. 
 
                                                          
♣ Forthcoming in F. Torres, A. Verdun, and H. Zimmermann, EMU Rules: The Political and Economic 
Consequences of European Monetary Integration, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft I wish to 
thank Svetlozar Andreev, Stefano Bartolini, Annette Bongardt, Alessandra Chirico, Paul De Grauwe, Erik 
Jones, Philippe Schmitter, Suzanne Schüttemeyer, Amy Verdun, Neil Walker, Helen Wallace, Chiara 
Zilioli, Hubert Zimmermann and participants at the EUI conference and ECB seminar for very useful 
comments on earlier versions of this paper. Of course, all remaining errors and shortcomings are my sole 
responsibility. This paper is part of an FCT research project on Economic Growth, Convergence and 
Institutions (research grant POCI/EGE/55423/2004, partially funded by FEDER). 
 2 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The so-called Community method of integration is said to face an efficiency-legitimacy 
trade-off (Héritier 2002; Höreth 1999; Scharpf 2001). According to this argument, it is 
not possible to increase the legitimacy of the EC system without decreasing its efficiency 
and vice versa. In other words, there is a trade-off between democracy and the European 
Union’s problem-solving capacity. Against that it can be argued from a normative 
perspective that legitimacy cannot be reduced only to performance. Notwithstanding such 
objections, some output legitimacy, for example through a well-functioning Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU), can contribute to and benefit from input legitimisation. 
Increased input legitimacy smoothes the processes of agreeing on and implementing 
common policies.2 The two processes are then cumulative in enhancing the democratic 
quality and effectiveness of governance in the EU. It is with that approach to input and 
output legitimisation that this paper discusses the trade-off between 
democracy/legitimacy3 and efficiency in the European monetary integration process. 
                                                          
2  To that extent the way in which the term effectiveness is used is somehow more demanding than 
just the relation between input and output of a given existing system. 
3  The concepts of democracy and legitimacy are often used in an interchangeable way without a 
proper distinction and/or as communicating vessels, as put by Gustavsson (2002). Good examples are the 
official Nice and Laeken Summit declarations, the first talking about “the need to improve and to monitor 
the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Union” and the other saying that “The EU derives its 
legitimacy from the democratic values it projects” (see Gustavsson 2002). Yet we know that a process can 
be democratic but not legitimate and vice versa. This paper recognises the importance of legitimacy insofar 
as delegations of power are concerned but it focuses on democracy – how transparent and accountable 
governance is in the EU. 
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Most authors dealing with the legitimacy problem, the democratic deficit and the 
efficiency4 of the decision-making process in the EU argue that it would have to be either 
a federal political union, with one government and one parliament, or a confederation of 
sovereign states, without majority-voting. In most of these analyses, the role of the 
European Parliament (EP) has been neglected. Frequently, it is analysed as a potential 
conventional parliament in a future federal political union. For a considerable part of this 
literature and also for many EU observers and national politicians, the European 
Parliament has “an inferior representative quality” and therefore it is argued that a 
parliamentarisation of the EU would not improve its democratic quality. 
 
1.1. Aim and scope of the paper and its structure 
 
This paper centres on the making of EMU rules and the overseeing of the European 
Central Bank’s (ECB) conduct of monetary policy. It examines whether there is indeed a 
trade-off between efficiency on the one hand and transparency and accountability (and 
participation and deliberation) on the other hand in the process of European monetary 
integration. 
While supranational regulation in the EU may be subject to the above referred 
trade-off, the process of building-up EMU might have enhanced different forms of 
participation, namely, by national parliaments and European citizens. It represented an 
accountable and relatively transparent power delegation of executive authority (from the 
Council to the ECB). If that is the case, and if there is no evidence of decreased 
                                                          
4  Throughout the paper the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness are used in an almost 
interchangeable way but the former refers more to the processes that create institutions and the latter to the 
institutions that deliver policies. 
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efficiency in that process, one has to look elsewhere for that trade-off. Moreover, 
monetary policy may well have been beyond the reach of the democratic political system 
before EMU. To abandon the intergovernmental mode of governance would not even 
have been subject to the legitimacy-efficiency trade-off (a non-zero-sum game). In that 
case, “elsewhere” is in the steady-state of supranational regulation of monetary policy, 
that is, the system since 1999 when EMU’s third phase began. Consequently, the actual 
operation of EMU has to be analysed in terms of its contribution to increased 
transparency and accountability (and participation and deliberation) of the 
implementation of monetary policy by the ECB. 
An additional but rather central question this paper tries to address is the nature of 
the increasingly important (though usually disputed) role of the EP as principal of the 
ECB. The EP’s growing involvement in overseeing the Central Bank’s activities is 
analysed with the aim to understand whether and how that new role has significantly 
affected the above mentioned trade-off in the supranational regulation of monetary 
policy. For that purpose it is necessary to understand whether the EP can actually assume 
the role of principal of the ECB without putting at risk the credibility (and consequently, 
effectiveness) of European monetary authorities in financial markets. Finally, the paper 
seeks to clarify how the EP diverts political pressure by various interest groups away 
from the monetary authorities towards itself.  
The paper is structured as follows: the next section examines the issue of 
increased centralisation of policies and of political structures in modern societies in 
general and in the EU in particular. Section 3 discusses the importance of enhanced 
accountability as a way of improving the quality and effectiveness of European monetary 
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integration. Section 4 deals with the question of the qualitative change in the process of 
continuously evolving governance in the EU against the background of the growing 
individualisation of society and the complexity of the issues at stake. Section 5 centres on 
the example of EMU from the perspective of its ability to bring into account uncontrolled 
forces through a process of multi-level political negotiation capable of creating credible, 
long-lasting institutions. Finally, section 6 concludes on how the responsiveness of 
governance in the EU has actually increased as the direct result of the making of EMU 
and on how that responsiveness has been further enhanced thanks to the emerging and 
still evolving role of the EP as a principal in regard to the ECB. 
 
2. Increased centralisation versus the growing need for democracy in the EU 
 
Concentration of decision-making in certain institutions in modern democracies mirrors 
situations in which legitimate principals have delegated power to agents for the sake of 
efficiency. The process of delegation itself may, as for instance one can argue for the case 
of EMU, meet transparency and accountability requirements. However, those legitimate 
principals expect agents to carry out policies that are consistent with their initial 
preferences. Nevertheless, for a variety reasons5 the agent’s actions may differ from the 
principal’s preferences. Transparency, in conjunction with accountability, is critical to 
ensure that agents comply as mandated. 
 
 
2.1. The issues of efficiency, accountability and responsiveness at the monetary level 
 
                                                          
5  For a brief review of these reasons, see Elgie (2000). 
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Enhanced transparency of European monetary policy, improves the democratic quality of 
the European integration process. In the case of EMU, compared with the previous 
situation (with the exception of Germany), there was already an increased degree of 
transparency, accountability and indeed participation. This increase occurred through 
referenda on the Maastricht Treaty, through public discussions during national and 
European election campaigns and during the making of rules. The EMU process of 
delegation met accountability and transparency requirements.  
However, it is possible to improve the democratic quality of monetary policy 
decisions by making sure that the agent’s actions do not differ from the principal’s initial 
preferences. It could be improved by means of enhanced transparency and accountability 
as well as through informal institutions (such as the interaction between the ECB and the 
EP) and deliberative processes among monetary policy experts that have different 
perspectives on the conduct of monetary policy (that might lead to more responsive EMU 
governance).6 
Bradbury (1996: 1) sees accountability as “the requirement for representatives to 
answer to the represented on the disposal of their powers and duties, act upon criticisms 
or requirements made of them, and accept (some) responsibility for failure, incompetence 
or deceit”. The concept thus requires sanctions or enforcement mechanisms. To hold 
agents accountable one needs not only transparency but also enforcement mechanisms.7 
These provisions are particularly relevant for the relationship between the ECB and the 
EP. In fact, although the EP’s oversight of the ECB’s activities lacks enforcement 
                                                          
6  See also Schürz (2002) for a discussion of the issue of democratic legitimacy with deliberative 
institutions for the case of the ECB.  
7  See Keohane and Nye (2003) for a discussion of these issues. As discussed in Torres (1996a) and 
in section 3 (3.2) the ex-ante specification of the rules of the game (EMU) was not part of the Treaty of 
Maastricht that focused on entry requirements rather than on working rules.  
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mechanisms – as it cannot pass any laws that define the goals and tasks of the ECB – it 
has been able to develop an informal role in overseeing the ECB. The litmus test for that 
capacity, i.e. a serious crisis or conflict, has not yet taken place. 
The process of globalisation made the tension between increasing complexity and 
the growing perceived need for further developed democratic mechanisms in modern 
societies more acute. Moreover, many of the various problems that modern societies face 
cannot be dealt with successfully by national political systems, for example monetary and 
financial instability. 
Governments of different countries can only partly deal with such types of 
transnational problems by collaborating. Collaboration comes at a high cost because at 
the intergovernmental level the process of reaching decisions is more complicated. There 
are thus (very concrete) additional costs in terms of efficiency. Citizens may feel even 
more acutely the need for enhancing democratic mechanisms given the lack of 
transparency and/or the insufficient participation in that type of decisions.8 The inter-
governmental level alone, while necessary for carrying on the European integration 
process both in terms of processes and outcomes, is neither an efficient nor a transparent 
way of governance in the EU. 
Where regional, national, inter-governmental and federal structures overlap, the 
tensions between increasing complexity and the growing need for democracy in modern 
societies is even more evident than at the national level. In the EU there is an on-going 
evolution in terms of sharing sovereignty that should increase efficiency. Stable forms of 
                                                          
8  For instance, for Kohler-Koch (1999) majority voting, although increasing the effectiveness of 
decisions in the EU at the intergovernmental level, infringes the sovereign right of the Member States to 
ultimately decide what is and what is not acceptable to their national constituencies. Note that this 
presupposes that the state still had de facto sovereignty. By pooling sovereignty in the EU some Member 
States might at least influence some decisions that they could not affect before. 
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political cooperation among the EU Member States are hence part of the solution as a 
way of improving efficiency. At the same time they are also part of the problem in terms 
of transparency and accountability. Given that in the EU responsibility is much more 
diffuse than in national systems, it is even more difficult to make the various institutions 
that formulate policies and/or take decisions at different levels accountable. 
The question then is how to address the identified democratic deficit in terms of 
democratic accountability in the EU. Gallagher, Laver and Mair (2001) discuss different 
ways of making decisions in the EU more accountable and responsive to European 
citizens. They identify three major possibilities: EU-wide referenda; direct elections for 
the president of the European Commission; and increasing application of the subsidiarity 
principle. While the latter is already enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), 
the two other solutions may suffer from being a too straightforward extension to the EU 
level of different national practices and traditions. More importantly, the growing 
complexity of political structures, especially acute in the case of the EU, sits uneasily 
with yes/no referenda (as was the case for Denmark, France and Sweden in the case of 
EMU, and France and the Netherlands on the European constitution) and/or simple 
extensions of national practices beyond the nation state. 
In the case of monetary policies, this paper departs from the perspective, 
explained below and shared by other authors (see De Grauwe et al. 1998), that too 
informal an accountability may not guarantee lasting institutions.9 Moreover, as argued 
                                                          
9  Note that there are other notions of accountability that do not necessarily require democratic 
accountability. An agency can be accountable to the markets (investors), to a dictator, or to specific groups. 
Keohane and Nye (2003) distinguish between several categories of accountability: electoral, hierarchical, 
legal, reputational and market accountability. Bovens (2006) distinguishes three different perspectives with 
respect to the assessment of accountability relations: democratic, constitutional and cybernetic. Zilioli 
(2003) defends that an economic rather than a “formalistic” notion of accountability should be applied to 
independent central banks. 
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by De Haan, Amtenbrink and Eijffinger (1998), the trade-off between central bank 
independence and accountability does not exist in the longer run. A central bank that 
continuously conducts policies that lack broad political support will sooner or later be 
overridden. As discussed in section 3, politicians will put the blame for the crisis onto the 
institutions that escape their control. Therefore, it was not only necessary to assure a 
broad and long discussion about the objectives of EMU and the aims of the ECB prior to 
the launching of its third phase but also to assure the proper oversight of the ECB by an 
institution that is representative of the European population.10 Public opinion cannot play 
such a role because it lacks democratic legitimacy and institutional structures. Other 
institutions such as the Council have deliberately chosen not to control the ECB to avoid 
any misperceptions and/or any temptation of conflicting views over the implementation 
of monetary policy.11 
 
2.2. A role of principal for the European Parliament 
 
The EP is the European institution that comes closest to fulfilling the functions of 
responsible representation and that of principal for different other EU-supranational 
bodies. It is the only representative institution at the EU level directly chosen by the 
people. It can be seen as an alternative (though from a particular perspective, 
complementary to national parliaments) for democratic accountability, not only in the 
case of supranational decisions in the EU but also in the case of qualified majority voting 
(QMV). In the case of the latter national governments may be outvoted in the Council 
                                                          
10  See Zilioli (2006), for a different perspective. 
11  With respect to some EU common policies, such as environmental policy, there is already a much 
more important level of participation than in the case of monetary policy and also an increasing level of 
transparency due to the European co-decision procedure, see Torres (2003). 
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and therefore cannot be held accountable to national parliaments. By its very nature, the 
EP is also relatively open and accessible to pressures from below allowing for instance 
for citizens’ petitions and questioning; it also facilitates the development of other 
emerging social structures, such as European parties or party families, independent from 
the nation states, the Commission and the Council.12 
As a representative institution, the EP has a unique role in the overlapping EU 
political structure: it increasingly interacts with the various national parliaments13, 
bridging the gap between national and European representation; it is more open and 
accessible than any other European institution to pressures from below, allowing for an 
increased participation of European citizens in the Community’s life; and it provides 
more transparency to the process of decision-making in the EU, which enhances the 
accountability of other European institutions, such as the Commission and the ECB. 
Moreover, as it will be argued in the next section the representative quality of the EP is 
also evolving since it has been assigned new roles in the Maastricht and Amsterdam 
treaties and European public opinion has picked up on that change.14 
Thus, it would be the European Parliament, or a possible European congress15, 
rather than an inter-governmental body such as the Council that would act as the sole 
                                                          
12  MEPs and their staff tend to listen to and receive all kinds of different experts and organised and 
non-organised interests as a way of negotiating and advancing their own proposals and reports. They are 
also open to citizens, the media, and researchers. 
13  The EP holds regular meetings with members of the relevant national parliaments’ committees on 
a wide range of issues such as EMU and hearings of the ECB’s President, the BEPG, the IGCs, EU 
enlargement and European constitutional matters. 
14  In addition, Europeans trust the EP more than other EU institutions and agencies (see 
Eurobarometer, 56 and 57); exceptions are Germany, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg where the Court of Justice and/or the ECB tend to score higher. The EP is also the best 
known EU institution (Eurobarometer 56, fig. 7.10) and it is perceived to play the most important role in 
the EU (Eurobarometer 56, fig. 3.6). 
15  As proposed by Habermas (2001: 99). 
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principal for the ECB and the European Commission.16 In the case of monetary policy, 
the EP may be particularly suited, and still enjoy the legitimacy to oversee the activities 
of the ECB. The EP might indeed provide a good balance between, on the one hand, the 
“tying of its own hands” by the Council (national governments) and, on the other hand, 
the need to assure if not a traditional form of accountability increased transparency of 
procedures and responsiveness of the ECB. However, one has to consider that such a 
change has to go hand-in-hand with both the principle of subsidiarity that also reflects 
proximity to the citizens and the democratic legitimacy of the EU vis-à-vis the different 
national governments. 
The EP may well increase the efficiency of governance at the European level by 
smoothing out various resistances to the acceptance of the ECB’s monetary stance. It 
would do so as a consequence of more transparency and participation and not at the cost 
of driving political decision-making further away from citizens. Moreover, the EP lies 
somewhat ambiguously along the chain of delegation between the European Council and 
the ECB and it may act as a principal under implicit delegation from popular sovereignty. 
This role of the EP has been neglected in the literature.17  
 
3. Central bank independence in the long run 
 
                                                          
16  In fact, an economic government, defended by several politicians, could interfere with the 
statutory independence of the ECB and it would not by itself add more legitimacy to the EU institutions in 
the eyes of the European citizens precisely because of its intergovernmental character. This is not to say, 
however, that more democratic bodies could not engage in power politics. 
17  Kohler-Koch (1999: 17) argues that the EP has “an inferior representative quality” and claims that 
there is a broad consensus in the scientific community that a parliamentarisation of the EU would not 
improve its democratic quality. This “inferior representative quality” of the EP is in general attributed on 
the basis of the “inferior quality” of European elections (disputed not on European but on domestic political 
grounds and with very low turnouts and different national voting rules and party lists) and of the lack of 
clear political and ideological cleavages (MEPs remain rather technocratic). See Føllesdal and Hix (2005) 
for a discussion. 
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If institutions are not responsive and somehow accountable one could solve short-
term problems of creating independent institutions but not the longer-term problem of 
their sustainability. Elected politicians will only defend independent institutions, such as 
the ECB, in the case of crisis if they can oversee their functioning. Paul De Grauwe (De 
Grauwe et al. 1998) goes even further in saying that “politicians will be willing to defend 
the independence of the central bank only if they know that they have the ultimate power 
to control the central bank”. Politicians will tend to put the blame for the crisis onto the 
institutions that escape their control and these will have to resist the pressures for a 
change of their policy stance. Only by becoming accountable, independent central 
bankers will ensure the political support that they will need for their long-term survival. 
If that is not the case a disruption might well occur because “ultimately politics rules”. 
Even in the very special case of Germany – where the monetary authorities 
enjoyed broad support – one can argue that the Bundesbank could not follow its way at 
very (indeed the most) important occasions of post-war German monetary history 
(examples are the European Monetary System, German Monetary Unification and EMU).  
 
3.1. Credibility and political constraints 
 
Based on the theory of economic policy that became popular in the late 1980s / early 
1990s (see Torres 1992) one needs to make a distinction between two types of constraints 
faced by policy-makers: credibility constraints and political constraints. Credibility 
constraints concern the temptation of policy-makers to deviate from their initial plans, 
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without any disagreements over the ultimate goals of policy. Political constraints regard 
conflicts of interest over those goals.18 
Governments face explicit credibility and political constraints. As a result, 
policies are the outcome of the government’s optimisation problem: the maximisation of 
a well-specified objective subject to those binding constraints. This approach translates, 
in the literature, into a number of positive models of economic policy in alternative 
institutional settings. These different environments vary from monetary and/or fiscal 
regimes and reforms to changes in government colour and organisation and determine the 
credibility and political constraints that policy-makers face. In the case of monetary 
policy the EU already deals with the credibility constraints that national and European 
policy-makers face by “tying their hands”.19 Therefore, the functioning of European 
monetary institutions should be free of political interference in the sense that they should 
be granted autonomy, as is the case of the ECB. That is however only a way of dealing 
with credibility constraints and not with political constraints. 
Given that political constraints regard conflicts of interest over the ultimate goals 
of policy, the creation of European institutions should also take into account those 
possibilities of disagreement. As argued above, in the EU discussions already took place 
during the creation of EMU and the ECB, through nation-wide referenda, several national 
                                                          
18  The idea of binding political constraints stems from the political business cycle literature, where 
governments have opportunistic incentives to adopt certain policies (for instance, in order to be re-elected), 
and from the theory of public choice, where there are conflicting policy preferences among different 
interest groups (because politicians and bureaucrats maximise their welfare rather than pursuing public 
interest) and/or the so-called agency and/or principal drift in principal-agent problems (Elgie and Jones 
2000). 
19  For the classical example of tying hands as a solution to the time-consistency problem, see 
Homer’s Odyssey: Ulysses asking to be tied to the ship’s mast in order to be able to listen to the sirens 
while resisting to the temptation to try to join them. See Elster (1984), Giavazzi and Pagano (1998), 
perhaps the most influential academic contribution to the convergence of ideas (and epistemic 
communities) in favour of EMU, and Torres (1987, 1989b). 
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and European elections and public debates. The process of making the rules of EMU was 
subject to democratic accountability. 
How is one to improve the ECB’s accountability without undermining its 
credibility in the financial markets?20 The answer developed below is that the European 
Parliament should have an enhanced role as principal of the ECB. Similarly, an enhanced 
role of the European Parliament in the formulation of policy decisions and/or at the EU 
legislative process may well improve the efficiency of common EU policies and the 
democratic quality of the process of European integration. Again, democratic quality here 
refers to the degree of accountability and the level of transparency and participation at 
different levels of government in the decision-making process. 
 
3.2. The emerging role of the European Parliament 
 
With the creation of the ECB, the heads of state and government delegated power to a 
new supranational institution. Yet, as put by De Haan et al. (1998), this one-time act of 
legitimisation cannot replace mechanisms of democratic accountability. From a 
normative viewpoint, such a delegation of powers to unelected officials may only be 
acceptable in a democratic society if central banks are in one way or another accountable 
to democratically elected institutions.21 Yet, it is possible to argue that the Member States 
                                                          
20  Avoiding excessive politicisation of agencies removes them from direct political control 
(Caporaso 2003: 13, Gustavsson 2002). To ensure central bank accountability De Haan, Amtenbrink and 
Eijffinger (1998), put forward three dimensions: decisions about the ultimate objectives of monetary 
policy; transparency of actual monetary policy; and who bears final responsibility with respect to monetary 
policy. 
21  The sub-optimality of the ECB’s accountability has been recognised by several authors; see for 
instance De Haan et al. (1998), De Grauwe et al. (1998), Harrison (2001), Torres (1996b: 76/77), and 
Verdun (1998). Harrison concludes however that, because of the relatively high degree of transparency of 
the ECB and the strength of its commitment technology, that sub-optimality should not impact on “its 
effective framework for success”. 
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have not only intentionally chosen to give autonomy to the monetary authorities but also 
have delegated authority to the EP to act on behalf of their long-term objectives as 
principal to the ECB.  
In fact, the Treaty of Maastricht gave the EP significant competencies. According 
to Article 113 (3) of the Amsterdam Treaty – formerly Article 109-B (3) of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (TEC) – the ECB’s president has to present the 
annual report to the EP. Moreover, the EP is entitled to hold a general debate on that 
basis and the ECB Executive Board can also be requested (and/or take the initiative) to be 
heard by the competent committees. Finally, the EP has to be consulted by the European 
Council upon the nomination of the entire Executive Board (TEC, Article 112(2b), 
formerly Article 109(2b)). 
Besides having managed to obtain the ECB’s Board of Director’s agreement on 
the presence of its President four times a year in the appropriate committee (the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs), the EP also holds meetings both with 
members of the relevant committees of the national parliaments and with experts to 
prepare those hearings.22  
The intention of delegating power to an independent central bank in the EU went 
hand-in-hand with the very idea of assigning a new role to the EP. The delegation of 
power to unelected officials (central bankers) by an act of Parliament (by a treaty ratified 
by national parliaments in the case of the ECB) does not by itself lack democratic 
legitimacy. Therefore, the idea that the European Parliament was assigned a new role 
                                                          
22  The first of those meetings — proposed by a national Member of Parliament and a MEP at the 
May 1998 London COSAC, one of the bi-annual meetings of the Conference of European Affairs 
Committees of national parliaments and the EP — took place in Brussels on November 3, 1998. 
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regarding the overseeing of the ECB does not contest the legitimacy of the European 
Council (and the fact that it can act on behalf of popular sovereignty).  
Let us follow what might have been the reasoning of the builders of EMU. One 
can then say that in order to deal with the credibility constraints faced by monetary 
authorities that do not enjoy yet a solid reputation of sticking to their announced goals, 
the principal (the Council in the name of the national governments participating in EMU) 
delegated to an agent (the new European monetary authority) control over its behaviour 
in regard to monetary policy. From a normative point of view, it would have been 
undemocratic if the agent (the ECB) had remained in control of the behaviour of future 
principals (the Council).23 That is why leading politicians and national governments in 
the EU proposed an economic government as a counterweight to the ECB. 
The initial principal (the European Council) did delegate to an agent but also 
established new (potential) mechanisms of democratic ex post control, namely 
monitoring and oversight, which can raise the quality of the democratic process in the EU 
without affecting the credibility of monetary policy in the financial markets and among 
economic agents in general. The initial principal tied its own hands and that of the 
Council of Ministers but assigned a new role to a new principal: the EP.24 
It is in this perspective without a clear ex ante specification of the rules of the 
game; namely, without any enforcement mechanism, that the EP may well oversee the 
                                                          
23  This claim parallels the normative claim referred to by Elgie and Jones (2000) that the preferences 
of both the principal and the agent should remain in line. The positive claim, which is also underlying 
agency drifting, that their preferences are bound to diverge points to the need for some form of oversight. 
24  Clear ex-ante specification of the rules of Economic and Monetary Union was not part of the 
Treaty of Maastricht and/or Amsterdam. See Torres (1996) for a discussion of possible ex-ante 
specifications of EMU rules concerning, among other things, enforcement mechanisms. 
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activity of the ECB.25 Furthermore, EMU can indeed work more effectively if political 
pressure from the various interest groups is directed away from the ECB towards an 
institution that represents the entire European population. The easiest way to secure that 
goal while preserving the ECB’s independence seems to be to recognise and enhance the 
role of the EP in overseeing the ECB’s activity (Torres 1996). 
In fact, an institution that is representative of the European population and 
attaches more weight to long-term objectives could better fulfil the role of a principal on 
whose behalf the ECB should conduct its policies than the Council that is also driven by 
short-term (electoral cycle) considerations. In fact, the EP cannot be so directly 
influenced by the electoral concerns of one or two governments in the EU. The 
opposition to those governments is also represented in the EP and may well have 
different views on the issue under discussion.26 
The role of principal of such an institution as the EP is consistent with a principal-
centred perspective (principal drift) of principal-agent problems (Elgie and Jones 2000) 
that is indeed particularly adequate to analyse situations that involve credibility 
constraints or time-consistency problems as in the case of monetary policy. It is also 
consistent with an approach that takes into account the possibility of a simultaneous drift 
by the agency (the ECB) and the initial principal (the European Council). The EP, as it 
does not necessarily share the potentially drifting views of the initial principal, the 
European Council, is particularly suited to oversee the activities of the ECB. The 
involvement of the EP in the oversight of the ECB’s activities has grown quite 
                                                          
25  As put by Elgie (2000), in the case of the ECB, any renegotiation of the set of ex-ante controls is 
unrealistic and even if the Treaty could be reformed that would undermine its very credibility.  
26  Hix (2001) concluded that for the first year of the 1999-2004 EP transnational party group 
affiliation was more important than national affiliation for determining how MEPs vote. It follows that it is 
not to be expected that say the German or Portuguese opposition would come to rescue their respective 
countries from an early warning concerning the excessive deficit procedure. 
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substantially. Elgie (2000) finds evidence that the EP has managed to “encourage” the 
ECB to not focus exclusively on its primary objective, price stability, but also pay more 
attention to its secondary objective: to support the objectives of the EU as stipulated in 
the Treaties (Article 2 of the TEU and of the TEC), namely sustainable development and 
employment (i.e. growth).27  
 
4. The on-going qualitative change in the nature of governance in the EU 
 
Evolving political co-operation has been increasingly subject to a multi-level political 
negotiation process in the EU. That process comprises, among others, co-decision and all 
ensuing EU directives and legislation in general, the discussion and approval of the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) (an increasingly important tool of soft policy 
coordination in EMU, supporting a more deliberative way of governance), the new open 
method of coordination (OMC), the new European Council Spring meetings, all sorts of 
European and national recommendations and parliament resolutions, the adoption of 
summit agendas and conclusions and of European strategies and white papers and, quite 
importantly, the domestic and European debate that takes place. 
Since the Amsterdam Treaty even intergovernmental conferences (IGCs), 
convened to revise the treaties, are increasingly characterised by multi-level political 
negotiations. These intergovernmental conferences include representatives of the EP 
regularly briefed by the negotiators who can give their views on all issues under 
                                                          
27  In the terminology of Farrell and Héritier (2002), this fact supports the importance of the effects of 
an informal institution on the interaction between the EP and the ECB. While these authors refer to 
empirical evidence indicating that such informal institutions have an important effect on interactions 
between the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, I focus here on 
the importance of the effects of such informal institutions on interactions between the European Parliament 
and the European Central Bank (see Elgie 2000, for evidence). 
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discussion. The EP’s views on the IGCs are increasingly important in shaping the 
European public opinion on these matters and therefore the inter-governmental 
negotiation process. 
National parliaments, too, participate in that process. Not least, they retain the 
ultimate power of ratifying the treaties. Moreover, they also participate in the process 
through regular hearings with national (and other) IGC negotiators, through bilateral and 
multilateral meetings with the European Parliament’s Constitutional Committee and 
through internal and open discussions (increasingly with representatives of the Civil 
Society) and resolutions. The European Convention of 2002/03 was the maximum 
exponent of the (multi-level) involvement/participation of many parties in such a process. 
It is through such a process that those EU policy constraints transform into European and 
national political objectives. 
Such a multi-level political negotiation process in the EU allows for a continuous 
discussion of processes and outcomes. That permanent discussion in turn permits 
increased transparency of and participation in the entire process of European integration. 
Moreover, that multi-level political negotiation process has also repeatedly allowed for 
the creation of a national and European consensus for reform at the EU level. 
Furthermore, the EU is in a process of transition towards a wider political union in 
Europe together with an increasingly important role of representative institutions. The 
process of integration and decision-making in the European Union is probably the only 
case of sovereignty-sharing that has proceeded steadily up to a point where some multi-
level governance can be already regarded as a polity. European institution building, with 
more efficient and transparent bodies and even transnational political parties, may be a 
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way of reinforcing the democratic quality of the European integration process, namely 
the link between participation and “responsible representation” of the voters and the 
guarantee that the existing social structures remain open and accessible to pressures from 
below. 
EMU is a good example of a process of a continuous multi-level negotiation 
during the discussion of its very rules inscribed in the Maastricht treaty, its convergence 
phase and current follow up arrangements. The process includes the implementation of 
the various national convergence programmes, the adoption and implementation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and other changes in domestic policy throughout several 
national, local and European elections. These arrangements require a permanent 
discussion and a negotiation at different levels of government.  
Clear-cut decisions over clear-cut issues may be decided very efficiently through 
a referendum but the same does not hold for more complex issues that cut across national 
interests: the probability of a continuous deadlock would be very high. Again, a multi-
level political negotiation process may render policy-making more efficient by allowing 
for a continuous confrontation of positions at various levels of government, making it 
possible and easier to converge to an acceptable common position. 
It follows that national parliaments, the EP and European citizens in general may 
have all become more aware of the need for more democratic control of new European 
institutions but also of the need of regaining democratic control over national 
governments and institutions that have become more unaccountable through the process 
of globalisation. Therefore, despite the inexistence of a European constitution (as yet) and 
a European government, EU governance may not be hindering European democracy but 
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rather extending it. The role of national and European representative (parliamentarian) 
institutions and also their interaction further enhances the transparency and effectiveness 
of EU governance.  
 
5. From monetary and financial external constraints to a common monetary constitution 
 
Previously, when monetary policy was basically set out by the German Central Bank for 
the entire European Monetary System (EMS) zone, national monetary authorities could 
not be held accountable for the implementation of monetary policy, devised and 
implemented in the system’s anchor country, Germany. National governments (with the 
exception of Germany) could only be held accountable for having taken the decision (and 
sticking to it) of joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS. 
EMU was a clear case in point of extending the democratic reach to policies 
beyond the national control by bringing them into account at the EU level. In most EU 
countries EMU has also worked not only as mechanism for economic stabilisation but 
also as prerequisite for structural reform and long-term development.  
Joining a monetary union based on institutions that deliver price stability is, as 
stressed by the modern political economy literature, probably the best way to implement 
a solid strategy of sustained economic development.28 The reason is that this option, 
besides precluding many of the transition costs (economically speaking, the output losses 
of a disinflation strategy) of such a regime change, is also more transparent in terms of 
policy objectives. In such a regime, the authorities raise the political costs of inflation 
                                                          
28  Institutions that deliver price stability encompass here not only the European Central Bank but 
also the monetary constitution of the EU (the ECB’s statutes) and other macroeconomic rules, such as the 
Stability and Growth Pact, etc., its ordnungspolitische Grundsätze, one may say. In that sense and 
according to North (1990: 3), “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”. 
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because the public can constantly monitor their anti-inflation commitment.29 Any 
different behaviour would imply a loss of competitiveness for the tradables sector.  
In the case of the EU, such a project was also a way of insulating all of the 
European economies that had embarked on the EMU project from foreign exchange 
speculation, exchange rate volatility and serious currency misalignments. Those could not 
only affect the macroeconomic stability of weaker currency countries and the 
competitiveness of stronger currency countries, thereby giving rise to protectionist claims 
and/or retaliations, but also put at stake the functioning of the Internal Market and indeed 
the entire European integration project.  
That argument was not trivial even for Germany since its commitment to EMU 
hinged exactly on the idea of protecting the internal market from currency misalignments. 
Thygesen (1996) further develops that idea claiming that protectionist demands, arising 
from a fragmented currency system, create industrial subsidies in the strong-currency 
countries. 
Adopting a credible monetary constitution that delivers price stability30 was also a 
means of removing the primacy of monetary policy over other more important concerns 
facing society, which was in particular the case in countries with less developed fiscal 
and monetary institutions like Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy (and now all new EU 
members). In those cases, EMU was a means of getting rid of national currencies and, 
                                                          
29  Fixed exchange rates, unlike other policy targets, are easily observable by the public (see Torres 
1990). 
30  Such an institution internalises both the costs of excessive inflation and exchange rate instability 
(see Torres 1996). Eichengreen and Ghironi (1996) provide other arguments for the case of low inflation 
countries in the context of EMU. 
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consequently, the typical excuses that technocrats find to cling to power and implement 
all kinds of mercantilist policies in the name of short-term real convergence.31 
Not surprisingly, in the case of some EU (laggard) countries, those very policies, 
which have been pursued until now, implied a sharp deterioration of social cohesion and 
the quality of life, undermining the long-term (sustainable) real convergence with the 
most developed regions of Europe.32 In other words, what at the first glance could have 
been seen as top-down (EU Commission and “statesmanship”) pressures were indeed a 
way through which some Member States were able to bring into account at the EU level 
uncontrolled transnational forces, such as the permanent threat of speculation against 
weaker currencies within the EU, avoiding serious currency misalignments that would 
endanger the entire European project.  
The objective of the realisation of EMU was instrumental for creating the 
necessary consensus to overcome specific interests in the pursuit of social welfare. This 
objective was not just economic orthodoxy (as Cox 1997 claims); EMU was an 
institution-building response to the challenges of European integration and globalisation 
(Jones, Frieden and Torres 1998, Torres 1994 and 1996, Verdun 2000a). 
The challenge of EMU may have started as the importing of ideas of some elites, 
and epistemic communities, reflected by the European Commission, central bankers and 
monetary economists and were initially embraced only by a leading fraction without the 
                                                          
31  What, at a first glance, could be branded as a mere “new constitutionalism” approach in the 
interpretation of Hewson and Sinclair (1999) — that is ring-fencing central banks from political 
interference with mandates to combat inflation — goes much further than that in the case of a common 
European monetary institution. In fact, the new monetary constitution of Europe, EMU, may be a way of 
avoiding the ring-fencing of many national authorities on monetary and financial external constraints and 
of creating the necessity — and the conditions — for increased transparency and accountability. 
32  Some countries tend to opt for derogations on matters such as energy costs (giving wrong 
economic incentives through lower energy costs to pollute more) in the name of short-term 
competitiveness. 
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participation of most of the national populations.33 However, having involved a 
prolonged period of multi-level political negotiation, the design and implementation of 
EMU allowed for increased participation of the European population. 
In fact, it is possible to say that the EMU process has not only increased the 
economic sustainability of the European integration process by avoiding the undesirable 
consequences of uncoordinated macroeconomic policies, but has also raised the quality of 
its democracy; not only in terms of efficiency, but also transparency and participation 
and, one might add, effectiveness, to the extent that new challenges were brought under 
more democratic control.34 This is because it has allowed for some new forms of political 
negotiation in establishing new goals and it is bringing into account a new common 
institution, the ECB. 
What the example of EMU demonstrates is that EU challenges allow for a more 
transparent discussion of national political objectives, making reform possible and more 
effective. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The challenges posed by the European integration process determine a continuously 
evolving system of governance in the EU because of the more clearly perceived need for 
democratic control of its new institutions and the way in which policies are formulated. 
However, the effectiveness of EU policies and the quality of democracy in the process of 
European integration can be enhanced if the intergovernmental mode of governance gives 
                                                          
33  Jones (2000) points out that such influences reflected epistemological rather than distributive 
considerations. 
34  See Jones (2002) for a similar conclusion in regard to efficiency and transparency. 
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way to the interaction of representative institutions at different levels and with civil 
society. 
As discussed above, that interaction can allow for more transparent and 
responsive modes of governance. Besides the intergovernmental mode of governance and 
in addition to supranational regulation, these new modes of governance include: joint 
decision-making, as is the case in the Single Market, and policy coordination, as is the 
case of the open method of coordination of economic affairs (for example in the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines and the European Employment Strategy). 
This paper did not elaborate on these new modes of governance and policy 
instruments. Rather, it explored issues related to the democratic deficit and challenged the 
common wisdom on this matter and on the efficiency-legitimacy trade-off in EMU 
governance. It tried to show that a shift from an intergovernmental form of governance to 
a supranational regulation form of governance not only does away with such a trade-off 
but rather enhances the democratic quality and effectiveness of European (monetary) 
governance. This finding is mainly due to the interaction between representative 
institutions and participatory and deliberative processes at different levels and stages in 
the process of building up EMU and to the interaction between the EP and the ECB as an 
informal institution. 
The emerging role of the EP in enhancing the responsiveness of decision-making 
in supranational regulation (monetary policy) has proved quite powerful at avoiding such 
a trade-off and indeed at improving efficiency and democracy in European governance. 
The responsiveness of governance in the EU has actually increased as the direct result of 
the making of EMU (democratic delegation of executive powers by the European Council 
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and the EU Council of Ministers to the ECB). That responsiveness has been further 
enhanced thanks to the emerging and still evolving role of the EP as a principal in regard 
to the ECB. 
The new role of the EP materialised because of the change in nature of delegation, 
i.e. the initial principal (the Council) delegated to an agent (the ECB) control over its 
behaviour in regard to monetary policy. The new principal in the making (the EP) has 
also allowed for increased participation in and deliberation on the discussions about the 
conduct of monetary policy by the ECB, contributing in this way to its greater 
transparency. These discussions have involved monetary policy experts and economists 
with different perspectives as well as national parliaments. National MPs can in turn 
better understand and discuss the appropriate policy mix in their own countries, with both 
national central bank governors and members of the national government that is 
accountable to them. 
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